Paddy Power Betfair Pays £2M for Player Protection Breaches

Article Content

Paddy Power Betfair to Pay £2 Million for Social Responsibility Failures

Paddy Power Betfair (PPB) has agreed to a £2 million regulatory settlement following a UK Gambling Commission (UKGC) investigation that found significant failings in its social responsibility controls. The ruling, announced on 17 December 2025, follows a review of the operator’s Paddy Power and Betfair brands.

The investigation, which covered a period between August 2023 and May 2024, identified multiple breaches of the Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice (LCCP) designed to protect customers from gambling-related harm.

The settlement consists of a £2 million payment in lieu of a financial penalty, which will be directed towards socially responsible causes. PPB will also cover the Commission’s costs for the investigation.

Details of the Breaches

A compliance assessment conducted in April and May 2024 found that four of PPB's licensed entities failed to comply with Social Responsibility Code Provision (SRCP) 3.4.3, which governs customer interaction.

The Commission found that the operator’s systems were not effective enough at identifying and acting on indicators of gambling harm. Specific failings included:

• Ineffective Harm Identification: The operator's systems were not sensitive enough to detect multiple indicators of harm, such as high-velocity deposits and significant overnight play. In one case, a Betfair customer deposited £12,000 in 15 days before a manual review was triggered. Another deposited £25,000 in 25 days before an interaction occurred.

• Delayed Interventions: The UKGC noted that even when harm indicators were identified, action was often not taken until the following day. One customer lost £12,300 on Betfair over five weeks before an interaction was attempted. When the attempt was unsuccessful, the operator placed a £500 monthly deposit limit on the account but allowed the customer to continue gambling, rather than implementing a stronger measure like a deposit block.

• Failure to Flag High-Risk Behaviour: The investigation highlighted cases where concerning behaviour was not flagged for timely manual intervention. One customer staked £86,000 on Betfair in just 16 days, losing £6,000, without a manual account review. Another customer engaged in a single session lasting nearly eight hours, placing over 300 bets totalling £20,000, which was only identified as a risk after the customer hit a loss trigger.

• Insufficient Automated Action: The Commission found that PPB failed to implement sufficiently strong automated processes for clear indicators of harm. For customers exhibiting high-velocity spending or regular, long overnight sessions, the UKGC stated there was no consideration of an immediate block until a manual interaction could take place.

The Investigation and Settlement

The licence review was initiated under section 116 of the Gambling Act 2005 and involved four of the group's remote operating licences:

• PPB Entertainment Limited
• PPB Counterparty Services Limited
• Betfair Casino Limited
• TSE Malta LP

In reaching the settlement, the UKGC noted several aggravating factors, including the serious nature of the breaches and the fact that the Commission has previously issued public statements regarding similar issues across the industry.

However, the Commission also acknowledged mitigating factors. Paddy Power Betfair cooperated fully with the investigation, accepted the failings at an early stage, and swiftly implemented an action plan to remedy the issues identified.

Implications for Customers

This enforcement action underscores the UKGC's focus on ensuring operators have robust systems to protect vulnerable players. The Commission expects all operators to learn from these failings and review their own practices.

Key takeaways for the industry include the need for safer gambling controls that can identify a wide range of harm indicators in real-time and trigger timely, effective interventions. The UKGC specifically highlighted the need for operators to consider escalating automated actions, such as an immediate account block, when strong indicators of harm are present.